those goals. Despite the optimism surrounding the recent developments in climate governance, these issues raise important questions about the viability of the current global governance to meet the +2° C target to prevent long-term climate disruption.
The thesis of this article is that existing deficiencies emphasize the need for long-term goals within the regime to guide short-term policy objectives. In many ways, the longterm trajectory is more salient to building and establishing effective climate policy than short-term objectives of national emission targets (Rayner 2010) . As it stands now, the hope is that by meeting short-term goals, long-term consequences will be mitigated. I argue that this may lead to ineffective results. Without a clear set of long-term objectives to drive climate negotiations, 'ad hoc approaches and incremental decisions may prematurely foreclose options for protecting the climate' (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003) now and for future generations. In addition, this approach neglects to address the underlying drivers of climate change, that is, the systems, institutions, and discourses in which the problem itself is created. If these drivers are not addressed, the efficaciousness of climate governance will be limited. This possibly will exacerbate present global inequities, and create a subclass of displaced and vulnerable populations.
In short, the current short-term approach does little to change the global structure in which the problem is embedded.
There are larger implications from this approach that are not extensively considered in literature or policies. Article 2 lays out the purpose of the climate regime, stating that the 'objective' is to avoid 'dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' (italics mine). Article 2 hinges on how 'dangerous' is defined and what exactly constitutes the 'climate system'-that is, is it merely the biophysical changes in the atmosphere or does it include impacts that affect people? The current approach to climate governance renders the definition of 'dangerous' to be a simple function of limiting global GHG emissions to avoid exceeding the 2° C threshold. This short-term prescriptive approach sees the issue as purely an environmental problem that can be managed through technical solutions to limit national GHGs based on discretionary country pledges. This unnecessarily mischaracterizes the problems posed by climate change. In addition, despite recent progress in bringing climate adaptation into the discussions through the Cancun Adaptation Framework and securing pledges for funding ($100B) over the next ten years (UNFCCC 2010c), there has been little practical global governance and implementation on large-scale adaptation. By treating climate problems exclusively as an environmental issue, the current adaptation structure treats the symptoms rather than the cause, ignoring other significant implications for policy.
Efficient and equitable climate policy cannot be achieved without first a definitional dialogue funneled toward developing long-term policy goals that should precede any short-range solutions. Hard targets may not be set, but particularly the USA and China must establish long-term goals; otherwise, short-term successes can be quickly undermined. Establishing long-term goals can offer multifarious approaches to meet those goals, rather than a direct, linear based on a 'one size fits all' approach that has led to the present inadequacies in climate governance. 4 It also allows shifts in political and economic global structure to accommodate more equitable and effective institutional arrangements to meet the long-term goals.
While the objective of the regime should remain climate stabilization to avoid dangerous interference, it should not be done based on GHG targets. In this light, argue for discarding national emission targets in favor of long-term goals based on renewable energy and enhanced security for those most vulnerable to climate impacts.
Article 2 of the UNFCCC

The history of Article 2
The core of the UNFCCC centers on Article 2, which outlines the objective of the agreement, and Article 3, which provides guiding principles to implement the Convention. These two Articles set up the remainder of the agreement, including the Since the adoption of the UNFCCC, however, attention in policy circles gradually shifted to the near term, particularly to the development, ratification, and reduced to a 'pledge and review' system. These developments have led increasingly to a narrowing of focus by the regime to ensure: a) the viability of the regime itself; b) tangible short-term imperatives are agreed to; and c) attempt to build consensus on these objectives. However, this narrowing of concentration has also led to discounting longterm goals.
Questions arising from Article 2
Article 2 is indeterminate, as it 'conveys some degree of the substance of the long-term goal while carefully avoiding any quantitative expression of it' (Gupta & van Asselt 2006: 83; Bodansky 1993 
Where we are today on Article 2
Since the inception of the UNFCCC, most of the activity on Article 2 has focused on the scientific and economic aspects of GHG concentration stabilization. Early on, the IPCC 6 There is criticism about the use of GHG concentrations as the measuring stick for slow climate change, primarily because there is no fixed quantifiable measure for anticipating future or anticipated GHG emissions. See, for example Victor (2001) . In addition, as the language has shifted to the 2 C threshold, it seems to run counter to the Article 2 standard.
interpreted Article 2 by seeing GHG 'concentrations stabilization' as a function of national emissions that aggregate in generating future temperature and sea level changes (Wigley 1995; Wigley et al. 1996; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005; Schellnhuber et al. 2006 are one of the seven crosscutting themes for all working groups (Patwardhan et al. 2003; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005) .
As the IPCC AR4 and the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010c) demonstrate, there is increasing dialogue on vulnerability and adaptation. However, the discussions remain at the periphery of climate policy, which remains driven by mitigation through national emission targets to reduce global GHGs. The goal of this policy approach is to prevent global mean surface temperature from exceeding another 2 C, after which many scientists agree certain key tipping points in the climate system may be triggered.
However, despite this near consensus on beyond 2 C temperature target, there remains uncertainty on what amount would prevent triggering dangerous tipping points. Thus the policy plan is based on reaching short-term targets and hoping that it is enough to achieve this 2 C goal.
Operationalizing UNFCCC Article 2
The climate process: How it works
At the global level, dynamics of IPAT, population growth, affluence and technology contribute to degradation of the biosphere. These drivers have tentacles reaching into the national and local levels influenced by more complex drivers of poverty, urbanization, land use, income distribution, values and governance ideology. These global drivers contribute to the structure that facilitates activities that generate GHGs.
These drivers merge and combine with anthropogenic drivers at the local level and individual level (see Figure 1 ). There, anthropogenic drivers of GHG emissions take place within national and global contexts. These 'agency' drivers include fossil fuel burning (transportation, refrigeration, and so on), increasing waste in landfills, land use (for example, deforestation, rice paddies), and industrial processes (such as cement production). 7 In addition, individual environmental values play an important role in supporting and justifying these material practices that lead to GHG emissions. These individual anthropogenic drivers lead to an accumulation of GHG emissions that enter the biophysical climate cycle, which then 'force' or produce local biophysical climate impacts such as changes in temperature, precipitation, and sea level rise (SLR). These climate changes impact human populations, which can be positive or negative, depending on sociopolitical and economic structure as well as geography. For many, particularly in vulnerable regions, this impact will be negative and will result in some form of human and societal impact (see Figure 1 below). 
Approaches to climate governance: Framing the 'Big Picture'
A fundamental question for climate governance is where along the cause-effect chain provides the most effective and equitable position to address climate change (see Figure   1 ). The UNFCCC and recent climate agreements assert climate change must be addressed in part through sustainable development. Sustainable Development, it is argued by the UN, is a three-sided equation of equity, environment, and economic development-the 3 E's. I will examine five possible approaches to address climate change (as depicted in Figure 1 ) in light of UNFCCC Article 2 and the three pillars of sustainable development.
The targets and timetables approach
The first approach is best characterized by the Targets and Timetables (T&T) approach (see Table 1 ). Currently, the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol (KP), and the Cancun Agreements (CA) all seek to regulate GHG emissions as the primary source of climate change at the national level. Based on this approach, the Kyoto Protocol commits developed countries to reduce GHG emissions to target limits. The single largest advantage of this approach is that it is already in use by the UNFCCC and IPCC (Torvanger et al. 2004: 9) . A second significant advantage is that it works within the current constructs of the state-based international system. So the incentive system runs parallel with the state-based system, providing rules and norms that help guide, implement, and to some extent, enforce GHG emissions' mitigation through binding global agreements supported by domestic mechanisms. Thus, this approach holds the state responsible for determining and implementing its own mitigation mechanisms to reach target emissions. A third advantage is that it is empirically calculable. A fourth advantage is that it is only one step removed from individual behavior (person, firm, plant, or corporation) that generates emissions. This reduces the level of uncertainty and enhances the validity of empirical measurements. Finally, as technology changes, new technical options are easily implemented to mitigate emissions, creating an attractive synergy between national governments and corporations that incentivizes new technology.
There are significant drawbacks to this approach, however. First, and most importantly, it relies heavily on the current international system, which is subject to severe disparities in power and leverage. The structure inherently serves the interests of the dominant powers. This has led to fractious negotiations that have ended in entrenched, seemingly intractable, positions by various states and their collaborative partners. Second, this represents only a short-term perspective for addressing climate change, with consequent solutions designed to slow the global GHG emissions that may trigger irreparable harm (which as discussed is the current medium-run goal of the regime). A third disadvantage is that it remains far removed from the effects and consequences of climate change. In fact, this approach offers no calculus of climate impacts, making it a highly inequitable policy approach for those who will suffer from significant climate effects. Because GHG emissions cannot be simply turned off, and even in the best mitigation scenario will continue through inertia, this approach has significant inequity built into it for those vulnerable to climate change impacts. In addition, this approach does little to address either the drivers of climate change and the political and economic structure in which climate change takes place. Thus, it entails deep structural inequity.
A fourth disadvantage is that it counts emissions based on the source of production and not consumption. This creates inequitable results because it provides a secondary incentive to locate the highest GHG producing activities in the poorest states. Already for economic competitive advantage, the 'dirtiest' production plants and firms are located in these areas, which overall tend to be the most vulnerable to environmental change. In essence, this provides cheap goods to the affluent with little or no environmental cost. In fact, people largely assume the environmental cost where the plant or industry is located through degradation and increased emissions, which could offset positive economic development in developing countries. Therefore, this approach creates a double incentive to locate these activities in poor states because powerful national governments would want the GHG emissions to be counted against least powerful states (with the power to do it). 9 Incentives converge for both national governments and corporations to locate high GHG emission-producing plants in developing countries generating severe inequity. Only by counting the GHGs where the good is consumed can climate policy generate equitable and economic benefits in line with sustainable development. However, this is not the case with the T&T approach.
The source approach
A second approach characterized by the source approach focuses on individual or local level emissions as the foundational drivers of GHG emissions. That is, peopleindividually, in communities or as part of corporations, produce and use fossil fuels that augment global GHG levels contributing directly to GCC. This approach would regulate those activities at the local level. This approach can take many forms, from emission Most importantly, clean energy technology can be applied at this level both to reduce emissions at the extraction/production site as well as at the consumer level. This provides a direct link to generating GHG reductions at the base level and does so as part of a long-term goal. In the current T&T approach, this is a tertiary goal-driven by the primary goal of reducing emissions at the national level. Here, the primary goal and focus of the regime is upon developing core technologies that can be used to produce cleaner energy, and use this cleaner energy in homes and buildings thereby enhancing efficiency, effectiveness, equity and security. Finally, it does offer some common ground for getting recalcitrant (yet differently positioned) countries like the USA and China to join in the global effort to combat global climate change, both through an incentivized approach based on technology and clean economies, as well as long-term 10 'Contraction' is the reducing of global GHG emissions, and 'convergence' is the closing of the gap between per capita emissions between the affluent and the developing countries to a level (in the future) where ultimately emission outputs are equal for every person. The total budget of carbon is to be equally shared through 'entitlements' based on a negotiable rate of linear convergence by an agreed upon timeline. 11 C&C was first formally proposed to the UNFCCC at COP-2 in 1996 by the Global Commons Institute, and at Copenhagen (2009) 
The structural approach
A third approach is a structural approach, where the focus of addressing climate change is on the structures that create and perpetuate GHG emissions. This approach addresses the underlying structural drivers of emissions leading to climate change. It would regulate climate change through changes to the political and economic systems at both the global and national scale. The primary advantage of this approach is that it attempts to get at the structural and institutional impediments to addressing climate change. For example, this approach would examine traditional structural dynamics leading to environmental degradation, such as population increases, technology, and affluence.
This leads to a second advantage in that it seeks to recognize the extent to which each state is contributing to the problem regardless of socio-economic starting point (based on GDP). Theoretically, this is formed upon equity grounds; however, it would ultimately turn on whether historical antecedents for socio-economic conditions and population growth were concomitantly taken into consideration. Another significant advantage is that it recognizes global climate change as a process that continually influences and changes the political and economic structure. So part of this calculus considers the feedback of biophysical processes from climate changes upon the macro human subsystem.
There are serious drawbacks to the structural approach. First, in many ways it relies heavily on GDP for determining responsibility toward climate change. As a result, it
would not differ much in international negotiations from the current T&T approach and thus have the same limitations. Second, if climate change is seen as a problem of structural drivers, then attending to those institutional drivers becomes a complex problem-one that may be as complex as the climate problem itself. For example, addressing trade disparities, conditional loans and investment streams that favor developed countries, is a complex and highly politicized debate. Increasing consumption in both developed and rapidly developing countries is another example-a significant issue that has been left off the discussion table altogether. Yet the climate problem is embedded within these structural disparities. Finally, addressing climate change through structural adjustments runs the risk of appearing as a welfare system designed to funnel financial and technological resources from the developed to the underdeveloped in a way that seems separate from the impacts of and responsibility for climate change. Most likely, these are fatal flaws that would lead to intractable collective action problems. However, the structural approach does demonstrate that addressing emission reductions and adaptation without attending to the structural drivers merely treats the symptoms of the climate problem.
The process approach
A fourth approach centers on the process and/or procedure through which international decisions are made in regulating commitments. The focus is on the international negotiation process, participation in the global environmental decision-making, access to a single society, it represents a specific justice approach to climate change that is not only relevant to generating equitable policy but one that cannot be ignored (Rawls, 1999:106) . Henry Shue argues that through this process, the well off should not be enriched at the expense of the not so well-off, thereby expanding inequality (Shue 1999 ).
Finally, it offers a platform for discussing burden sharing, and how to spread the costs The disadvantage of the process approach is that ultimately negotiation (at any level) is about leverage, and thus is about power. Power in the international system is inherently unequal, giving little leverage for those disenfranchised. Similarly, the international system continues to be dominated by sovereignty and state self-interest, which again diminishes procedural aspects of standing and access for those disaffected by climate changes. Moreover, the powerful can use bargaining tactics to undermine collective action. As Henry Shue points out, many countries such as the United States (and now China) are employing a strategy of waiting for others to do their 'fair share' before they will agree do the same, resulting in paralysis (Shue 2011) . So, the powerful can manipulate the procedural process through which climate outcomes are negotiated, 13 This theory is here applied generally to the international arena in the climate context. The argument here is that fundamentally distributive justice (in theory) lacks the capacity of imposing differing obligations between the domestic and international arenas, as 'nationality' would be an arbitrary characteristic similar to innate talent, race or social status. In addition, this process approach would not necessitate direct wealth redistribution, but a duty to assist those who are directly affected by human induced climate change, and to do so to the extent of full reparations. leading once again to unjust outcomes. This suggests that representation and standing do not necessarily guarantee an efficient or equitable outcome for parties, and may be ineffectual as a global instrument. In addition, a voice without standing (political or legal) has little meaning, and further without a legal structure or venue to protect access, the procedural approach may make little difference in outcome. Finally, this approach cannot represent a stand-alone approach to climate policy; in fact, it must operate as a complement to another approach.
The outcomes approach
Finally, the fifth approach is one based on outcomes of climate change. That is, climate policy is developed by examining the effects of GCC, particularly in local communities and specific contexts. The most compelling rationale supporting the outcome approach is that, because there are multiple ways to achieve just and efficacious climate policy, it offers a more diverse platform for equitable burden sharing (Rayner 2010 T&T approach in many ways inhibits economic motivation from being fully pursued and realized. It politicizes the climate regime and inhibits both market incentives and fails to address the human security of vulnerable peoples. As a result, at the global level the targets and timetables strategy inspires various forms of free riding, as larger national economies can continue business-as-usual without any additional economic costs, 16 while others suffer the consequences. Without long-term goals and assessments, this free riding remains and national economic self-interest and externalizing economic and environmental costs become the driving forces of the climate regime.
However, when the question is changed to ask how much of climate change can (and should) be accepted by the global community, the calculus changes. I am not suggesting that nations will not continue to view climate policy through a lens of self-interest.
Rather, climate change is a global problem that creates changes in global climate, and thus to solve it requires a global perspective-not a conglomeration of national perspectives. This global perspective is further justified by two elements, one that humans are directly and disproportionately affected by the actions of other humans, and second, that the earth's biosphere is a global commons that all human beings are entitled 16 Some scholars may suggest that economic opportunity costs arelost by delay, particularly in developing renewable energy technologies, and has been suggested, there are many who suggest that the long-term consideration of climate change has present economic costs of delaying action now (Stern 2007 to enjoy free of harm. On the former, the disproportionate effects create not only severe inequity but also serious security risks at the national and global levels.
In shifting the question to a global perspective and away from national self-interest, the foci of the problem itself are transformed in two ways. First, it includes those adversely affected by climate change and therefore brings the outcome approach to the fore, and second, the question emphasizes some form of an approach that is best for the global community, and not exclusively based on state self-interest. The emphasis then is on a source approach, one that may focus on creating clean energy and new technologywhich can be employed to the benefit of the global community. Simply put, this is a global problem affecting all nations (and people) and solutions should benefit all nations and the global community. This approach transforms the climate debate into a positive sum game.
When outcomes and sources are included in climate policy discussion, the calculus for mitigation is also changed. That is, adaptation becomes a cost of mitigation, and more emphasis is put on preventing the damage caused by human augmented GHG emissions (to reduce the costs of adaptation). So, if mitigation is solely part of the economic calculus, then for self-interested individuals, the equation is simple: is the harm from global climate change (to themselves or community) greater than economic costs of mitigation? Most in the USA see little harm from GCC to themselves personally, and therefore any economic cost is likely too high. However, if adaptation is part of the cost equation-that is, harm to others caused by GHG emissions, then the costs of doing nothing increase and becomes part of tradeoff analysis for climate policy. Action to prevent future harm (and costs) becomes imperative. In this form, justice emerges naturally from the cost equation, not as a function of strict national mitigation and/or historic responsibility. In addition, it provides political justification for domestic policies on climate change, particularly for the USA. As such, this is the core strength of the outcome approach to global climate change. Even further, this can be incentivized through the source approach based on developing clean technologies.
Assessing 'danger' in Article 2
The threshold question from Article 2 for long-term climate policy centers on assessing (i) DAI-dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, and (ii) what are the subject(s) of the prevention. In preventing DAI with the climate system, the Considering the whole of Article 2, should concentrations (through radiative climate forcing) reach a level where changes to the ecosystem outpace adaptation and/or threaten food production, it would indeed constitute 'dangerous' interference with the climate system. This provides an initial clue that the framers were thinking to include 'impacts' to human support systems when drafting the Article. In fact, in some parts of the world-for example, atolls, the Arctic, lowlands of Africa-we are already seeing the pace of changes outstrip natural adaptation, food production, and adaptive capacity.
In addition, much of international environmental law (IEL) has evolved primarily based 'Adverse effects of climate change' means changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socioeconomic systems or on human health and welfare.
As part of the Convention, Article 1 suggests concern for socio-economic and health aspects of climate impacts, not just biophysical impacts (See Jamieson 1992 Rayner & Malone 1998; Adger 2001; Gupta et al. 2003; Gardiner 2006 ). In addition, 1911 (1938 ), reprinted in 33 A.J.I.L. 182 (1939 ), 3, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1938 (1941 ), reprinted in 35 A.J.I.L. 684 (1941 .
In further support of this interpretation, the final sentence of Article 2 gives significant primacy to 'sustainable development.' Although this could be an attempt to privilege economic development relative to climate change and environmental harm, it nevertheless demonstrates a linkage between climate 'danger,' its outcomes (effects), and sustainable development (Brundtland 1987) . Given the history of sustainable development and climate change, the nexus between sustainable development-defined by the WCED as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'-and climate change fit naturally with the ideas of stabilizing future concentrations and preventing dangerous outcomes-particularly for future generations (Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005) . This emphasizes the three Es of Environment (protection), economic (development) and equity (fairness in process and substance) as part of climate governance. Reading both the precepts of sustainable development in line with Article 1 of the UNFCCC strongly suggests that not only would DAI include climate impacts, but it would also include socio-economic, cultural, and health (mental, emotional and psychological) impacts in addition to the biophysical ones (IPCC 2007d; Schneider et al. 2001) . To include these necessary elements therefore endorses the outcome approach to climate policy.
Article 2: A 'danger' to whom?
What remains unanswered, however, is what a 'danger' is to whom and how should those 'in danger' be assessed? Here, there is no easy answer. A single, absolute metric of 'dangerous anthropic interference' cannot be attained due to differential impacts and vulnerabilities (Dessai et al. 2003 (Dessai et al. , 2004 Schneider 2001 Schneider , 2004 Jacoby 2004 ).
Moreover, 'dangerous' is a socially constructed term that requires knowledge of local context to understand how these impacts and vulnerabilities contextually play out. In determining DAI, value judgments are necessary to determine who is affected. Such value judgments are context specific (Dessai et al. 2004) and imply judgments about selection, comparability and significance, which in turn suggest that peoples'
perceptions play a large role in defining 'dangerous' (see, generally, Azar & Sterner 1996) . In other words, 'various societies and peoples may value the significance of impacts and vulnerabilities on human and natural systems differently' (IPCC 2007d: 784) . For example, a resource-dependent society will value protecting its resource base more than most developed countries, and will thus prioritize the risk or 'danger' to those to define 'dangerous anthropogenic interference' with the climate system in identifying those threats.
Developing long-term goals to address these threats from global climate change depends in large part on defining and operationalizing elements of UNFCCC Article 2.
In attempting to operationalize Article 2, I showed that there are several stages in the causal process where climate changes could be measured, monitored and addressed by the regime. Currently, the regime has adopted the T&T approach to address climate changes, which has been shown to be politically difficult in international negotiations, particularly considering China and the USA are reluctant to engage in national emissions caps. Without addressing the unsustainable drivers of GCC, this approach may not address effectively the climate problem even if fully implemented. It also runs the risk that it may exacerbate current global inequalities, which places additional emphasis on developing a climate architecture that includes fair distribution of the responsibility and burdens from climate change. However, despite the proliferation of literature on burden allocation, from a policy perspective, it is very difficult to negotiate and get self-interested actors to comply with agreed-on parameters.
One of the primary risks from climate change to global (and national) economic and political systems is the increasing cost from growing insecurity and inequity. Both elements provide a challenge to the global system, a risk that is underrepresented in current international negotiations and climate policy calculi. Instead of climate security, responsibility and equity framing the climate debate, it has been mischaracterized as a singular environmental issue using the T&T approach. Climate change however is not a function of environmental degradation per se, but rather a function of unsustainable drivers of human development that represents significant threats to human systems, particularly those most vulnerable. This explains why traditional environmental methods and solutions have been ineffective in addressing the climate problem.
Therefore, the climate regime must replace the T&T approach with a combination of outcome and source approaches. By adopting these approaches, it essentially splits mitigation and adaptation into two separate strategies. The first is based on energy transformation and sources of emissions, where major polluters, the USA and China, can build common ground. By focusing on energy transformation will deviate each country from the business as usual path, while bypassing what may be an intractable problem of fair allocation and responsibility. The second is an explicit focus on adaptation because as currently constituted in the regime, adaptation is a secondary priority to mitigation.
The source approach shifts the focus away from national GHG emissions' limits to the development of clean energy toward long-term goals of carbon neutrality and (relatively) equal per capita emissions. In operationalizing this aspect of Article 2, it establishes targets based on the development of clean energy and renewable energy implementation (and targets), which can be more effectively integrated into an incentivized climate regime as well as address directly the drivers of GHG emissions.
This approach also offers synergies and incentives for the USA and China to cooperate.
Both countries recognize that 'green growth' is a key to the future of economic development, and both recognize not only the harmful effects to ecosystems and humans from industrial processes, but also that energy systems must be transformed. In addition, energy targets could be integrated into a system of contraction and convergence that allows for higher emissions, at least temporarily, the more funding and research put into energy development. This would create more equitable framework, based on contracting emissions per capita, while emphasizing energy transformation.
The source approach therefore is a bridge between the seemingly growing gap between
China and the USA, as well as bridges the divide between developed and developing countries. It provides a path forward where none exists currently based on the T&T approach.
This shift would also recognize, through the outcome approach, the need to protect those most immediately threatened by the effects of climate change. It was established that this includes climate impacts more generally, and includes not only biophysical effects but also socio-economic, cultural and psychological effects. Next, this process should be examined at the local level and by studying how people are affected by a combination of causal and consequential pathways. These macro-approaches to climate change would be more effective in both addressing the drivers of GHG emissions (rather than based purely on outcomes) and provides clearer incentives to climate action.
They also work together to create a more equitable approach (a mandate from both UNFCCC regime and sustainable development), both normatively in establishing longterm non-binding goals as well as empirically through active protection of the most vulnerable as a function of security-not merely as a handout or opaque notions of justice. 18 In the final analysis, creating long-term goals with guideposts built around the source and outcome approaches is critical not only to creating an efficacious and equitable climate architecture but to the policy and governance of the issue.
